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ABSTRACT
The Amcache.hve is a registry hive file that is created by Microsoft® Windows® to store the
information related to execution of programs. This paper highlights the evidential poten-
tial of Amcache.hve file and its application in the area of user activity analysis. The study
uncovers numerous artifacts retained in Amcache.hve file when a user performs certain ac-
tions such as running host-based applications, installation of new applications, or running
portable applications from external devices. The results of experiments demonstrate that
Amcache.hve file stores intriguing artifacts related to applications such as timestamps of
creation and last modification of any application; name, description, publisher name and
version of applications; execution file path, SHA-1 hash of executable files etc. These ar-
tifacts are found to persist even after the applications have been deleted from the system.
Further experiments were conducted to evaluate forensic usefulness of the information stored
in Amcache.hve and it was found that Amcache.hve information is propitious to trace the
deleted applications, malware programs and applications run from external devices. Finally,
comparison of information in Amcache.hve file with information in other similar sources
(IconCache.db, SRUDB.dat and Prefetch files) is shown, in order to provide more useful
information to forensic investigators.
Keywords: Amcache.hve, Windows Registry Forensics, User Activity Analysis, Program
Execution Analysis, Malware Analysis
1. INTRODUCTION
In digital forensic investigations, it is some-
times essential to carry out user activity
analysis on a suspected system to know re-
cently accessed file and folders, run appli-
cations and their execution history. User
activity analysis is also helpful in detection
of the anti-forensic behaviors carried out to
hinder investigations. The Amcache.hve file
is a very useful resource in the area of user
activity analysis to analyze recently run ap-
plications and their execution history. Ear-
lier, the forensic analysts had access to Re-
centFileCache.bcf file, which has been re-
placed by Amcache.hve file in Windows 8
and later versions. Harrell (2013) has high-
lighted the forensic artifacts stored in Re-
centFileCache.bcf file. However, the Am-
cache.hve being newly introduced, is not yet
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explored in digital forensics community.
The Amcache.hve stores information re-
lated to Windows Application Experience
and Compatibility feature in a registry hive
file. Forensic analysis of Amcache.hve file
can reveal important artifacts such as pro-
gram name and version, execution file path,
file size, installation timestamp, the times-
tamp of first run, hash of executable file etc.
This information persists in Amcache.hve
even when the applications and Prefetch
folder have been deleted on a user’s com-
puter. Therefore, Amcache.hve is also useful
in detection of anti-forensic tools, thus, re-
vealing the intentions of a user. Although,
the Amcache.hve exposes forensically useful
information, it has not been leveraged by
forensic analysts as an analytical method for
detection of anti-forensic behaviors.
The traces of recently run applications
and their usefulness in forensic investigations
have been discussed in various literature
published. Singh & Singh (2016) have shown
the traces of recently accessed files and run
applications in Jump Lists on a Windows
system. The authors demonstrated that the
traces of run applications persist even after
the applications are removed from the sys-
tem. Carvey (2005, 2011) and Wong (2007)
have described that numerous artifacts re-
lated to run programs on Windows system
are recorded in UserAssist registry key. Mee
& Jones (2005), Carvey & Altheide (2005)
and Mee et al. (2006) have investigated the
UserAssist key to identify the external de-
vices that have been connected to the sys-
tem in order to run a malware program
or an anti-forensic tool. Collie (2013) has
examined the evidential potential of Win-
dows IconCache.db file and found that Icon-
Cache.db file stores artifacts related to ex-
ecutable files when they are present on or
run from USB connectable devices. Fur-
ther, Lee & Lee (2014) identified the struc-
ture and highlighted the importance of Icon-
Cache.db file in forensic investigations. The
authors demonstrated that IconCache.db file
stores full file paths for executable files that
have been run, viewed, or installed on a
Windows system. Khatri (2015) has exam-
ined the SRUDB.dat file in Windows 8 as a
new database for tracking user activities and
linking launched programs by users. The
author has demonstrated the usefulness of
SRUDB.dat database in forensic investiga-
tions by tracking Windows Store App runs,
tracking processes run from external media
devices, tracing deleted processes and anti-
forensic tools. In recent study, Singh &
Singh (2017) provides in-depth understand-
ing of the artifacts and their location cre-
ated by Cortana application in Windows 10
system. However, we could not find any
literature published on forensic analysis of
Amcache.hve file except a brief narration by
Kim & Lee (2015).
This study mainly investigates the ar-
tifacts created and retained in the Am-
cache.hve file when a user performs certain
actions, such as running executable files from
host or from USB devices. The effects on
Amcache.hve of installing package applica-
tions containing many executables files tied
into a package, are also considered. The pa-
per provides an overview of how the Am-
cache.hve file comes into existence and how
it grows in size and records the artifacts.
The effects of anti-forensic attempts on Am-
cache.hve are also taken into consideration,
however, results of this experiment may vary
depending upon the version of Windows op-
erating system. Furthermore, the forensic
application of Amcache.hve is evaluated in
terms of tracking deleted applications, mal-
ware programs and applications run from ex-
ternal storage devices. The paper also iden-
tifies the locations and artifacts recorded in
interrelated files, however, the prime goal of
study is to extract the information retained
in Amcache.hve file and its application in
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digital forensics.
2. MOTIVATION AND
RESEARCH
METHODOLOGY
There exists few posts on digital forensic
blogs which describe the forensic usefulness
of Windows 8 Amcache.hve file. However,
the effect of user activities on Amcache.hve
file in different distributions of Windows is
not yet highlighted in forensic community.
The research method used in this paper
is based on observations and experiments.
For studying the behavior of Amcache.hve
with respect to user activities, several exper-
iments were conducted on three test com-
puters: a laptop running Windows 8 Pro,
a desktop running Windows 8.1 Pro, and
another laptop running Windows 10 Pro
(v1511). A number of user activities were
carried out on these test computers in ac-
cordance with the objective of the experi-
ment. For extracting Amcache.hve file from
test computers, a Live Boot DVD of Ubuntu
14.04 LTS was used. The Amcache.hve file
from each test computer was then parsed us-
ing Registry Explorer (Zimmerman, 2015).
The findings drawn on the basis of observa-
tions are discussed in Section 4. Apart from
it, Amcache.hve files from several other sys-
tems running different distributions of Win-
dows were extracted and analyzed to vali-
date the findings.
3. AMCACHE.HVE
FILE IN WINDOWS
Microsoft Windows operating systems use
Application Experience and Compatibility
feature to ensure the compatibility of soft-
ware among different distributions of Win-
dows operating system (Microsoft, 2016).
For this, Microsoft implements Windows
Compatibility Infrastructure (Shim Infras-
tructure) technique in Windows operating
systems. The mechanism of Shim Infrastruc-
ture technique is beyond the scope of this re-
search. However, the implementation of this
feature generates some interesting artifacts
related to program executions that can be
leveraged in digital forensic investigations.
Davis (2012) leveraged application compat-
ibility cache data to recover artifacts such
as file size, file last modified time and last
execution time. In this research, we high-
light the usefulness of Amcache.hve file in
forensic investigations as one of the artifacts
associated with Application Experience and
Compatibility feature.
The Amcache.hve is a registry hive
file introduced in Windows 8 as the
replacement of Windows 7 RecentFile-
Cache.bcf file under %SystemDrive%
\Windows\AppCompat\Programs directory.
We observed that the Amcache.hve is
now also available in Windows 7 systems
since October 2015. Depending upon the
operating system in use, the Amcache.hve
file is stored at following locations:
 Windows 7/8/8.1: %System-
Drive%\Windows\AppCompat
\Programs\Amcache.hve
 Windows 10: %System-
Drive%\Windows\appcompat
\Programs\Amcache.hve
The structure of Amcache.hve file follows
Windows NT Registry File (REGF) format.
Microsoft uses REGF format in Windows
NT (or later) to store a part of the Win-
dows registry. There are many software tools
(Carvey, 2013; NirSoft, 2013; AccessData,
2014; Zimmerman, 2015) available to parse
and view the registry file. The following sub-
sections describe the information recorded in
Amcache.hve and its interrelated files.
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3.1 The Hive
The Amcache.hve file contains sections of
4KB referred as “bins.” As the Amcache.hve
file grows, these bins make allocation as
well as maintenance of the hive file itself.
The Amcache.hve starts with four bytes sig-
nature value “regf” (0x72656766). Figure
1 shows the hierarchical structure of Am-
cache.hve file; seven subkeys (folders) un-
der the ‘Root’ key were observed. The in-
formation of interest to a forensic analyst
is located in the ‘File’ and the ‘Programs’
subkeys. The subkeys under the File key
are the Volume Globally Unique Identifiers
(GUIDs) of the mounted devices. The infor-
mation related to mounted devices can be
corroborated with the values of registry key
at HKLM\SYSTEM\MountedDevices.
3.2 File References
Each Volume GUID stores file reference
keys and each file reference key represents a
unique file on disk (Khatri, 2013). The val-
ues of the file reference keys were observed
from 3 to 23 in Windows 8/8.1/10. Table 1
shows value name, value type and data for
file reference keys. Minimum three values
were observed under any file reference key
namely 15, 17 and 100. The value 15 stores
full path to the executable file from that was
run. The value 100 represents the program
ID that may be found under the Programs
key. The value 101 represents the SHA-1
hash of the executable file preceded by four
extra 0s. The last write timestamp on a
reference key in Registry Explorer is consid-
ered as the timestamp of application’s first
run. No change was observed in timestamp
on subsequent runs of applications. Few file
reference keys store all 23 values, thus, con-
taining more information related to that ex-
ecutable file. The value 11 and 17 repre-
sent last modified timestamps which were
observed to be same when decoded. Major
portion of file reference keys was identified;
however, the purpose of few fields (data in
values a, b, d, 10) remains unknown.
Table 1. Stored information in file reference
keys
Value Value type Description
0 Unicode Program name
1 Unicode Publisher name
2 Unicode Program version (major)
3 DWORD Language Code
4 QWORD SwitchBackContext
5 Unicode Program version (minor)
6 DWORD File size (in bytes)
7 DWORD
PE Header field-
SizeOfImage
8 Unicode Hash of PE Header
9 DWORD
PE Header field-
Checksum
10 DWORD
Unknown (always 0, 6
or 13 in all tests)
11 FILETIME Last modified timestamp
12 FILETIME Created timestamp
15 Unicode Full path to file
16 DWORD
Unknown (0 or 1 for all
tests)
17 FILETIME
Last modified
timestamp 2
a QWORD Unknown
b QWORD Unknown
c Unicode File description
d DWORD Unknown
f DWORD Linker timestamp (Unix)
100 Unicode Program ID
101 Unicode
SHA-1 hash of executable
file
3.3 Programs Key
The subkeys under the Programs key are the
program IDs assigned to each MSI package.
The information stored in a program ID is
similar to the information in a file reference
key. The number of values in a program ID
was observed from 12 to 21 in Windows 8/8.1
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Figure 1. Directory structure of Amcache.hve file
and 16 to 21 in Windows 10 system. Each
program ID contains important information
related to installed application as summa-
rized in Table 2. For all the cases, the data
in value 10 and 12 represents package GUID
and was found to be same. Further, the
data in value 11 and f describes product
GUID and was also observed to be same.
The product GUID was also found in unin-
stall registry key (value 7). The information
in value a represents the timestamp of ap-
plication’s installation and the information
in value b represents the timestamp when
the application was deleted (uninstalled). In
the analysis, data in value Files was found
as list of files referenced by package appli-
cations. Each referenced file under Files
list is represented as VolumeGUID@FileRef
where FileRef is the file reference key be-
neath Volume GUID of the File key. In test-
ing, it was observed that not all referenced
files in Files list could be found in file refer-
ence keys. The relevant fields in a program
ID were identified; however, purpose of few
fields remains unknown that can be explored
in further study.
3.4 Inter-related Files
It was observed that there exists four
inventory files associated with Amcache.hve
file; however, these files are temporarily
stored on disk and automatically cre-
ated and deleted during user actions.
The location of three inventory files:
ApplicationInventory.xml, DeviceInven-
tory.xml and FileInventory.xml is under
the directory %SystemDrive%\Windows
\appcompat\appraiser \Gated in Windows
10. Apart from these three inventory
files, one more inventory file associated
with Amcache.hve file was observed under
the directory %SystemDrive%\Windows
\appcompat\Programs. This inventory file
consists information related to installed pro-
grams, files and Internet Explorer Add-on
list.
4. EXPERIMENTS
AND RESULTS
The experiments are divided in three sets:
baseline Amcache.hve research (Set A), ad-
vanced Amcache.hve research (Set B) and
anti-forensic attempts on Amcache.hve (Set
C). In Set A, the baseline behavior of Am-
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Table 2. Stored information in programs ID
keys
Value Value type Description
0 Unicode Program name
1 Unicode Program version
2 Unicode Publisher name
3 Unicode Language Code
5 DWORD Unknown
6 Unicode
Install source (always Msi,
AddRemoveProgram or
AddRemoveProgramPerUser
in all tests)
7 Unicode Uninstall Registry key
10 Unicode Package GUID
11 Unicode MSI product GUID
12 Unicode MSI package GUID
13 DWORD
Unknown (always 0 in
all tests)
14 DWORD
Unknown (always 0 in
all tests)
15 DWORD
Unknown (always 0 in
all tests)
16 Binary Unknown
17 QWORD
Unknown (always 28147497
67116800 in all tests)
18 DWORD
Unknown (always 0
or 1 in all tests)
a QWORD Install timestamp (Unix)
b QWORD
Uninstall timestamp (Unix,
0 if program is not uninstalled)
d Unicode List of file path
f Unicode Product GUID
Files Unicode
List of file entries in package
(VolumeGUID@FileRef)
cache.hve is observed after a clean install of
different operating systems. For this, var-
ious experiments are performed to observe
the initial content of Amcache.hve and in-
terrelated files and content after reboot of
operating system. In Set B, various exper-
iments are performed to observe the effects
on Amcache.hve file as a result of repeated
user activities such as running host-based ex-
ecutables, installing applications from host,
running portable programs from external de-
vices and installing applications from exter-
nal devices. In Set C, the experiments are
carried out to simulate the anti-forensic at-
tempt like evidence destruction (deletion of
Amcache.hve file). The objectives of the ex-
periments devised in accordance with these
sets are summarized in Table 3. The tools
used in this research are listed in Table 4.
The following subsections describe the re-
sults of the experiments formulated in Table
3. For performing the experiments in Set A,
the following distributions of Windows op-
erating systems were taken into considera-
tion: Windows 7 Professional 64-bit, Win-
dows 8 Pro (Build 9200) 64-bit, Windows
8.1 Pro (Build 9600) 64-bit and Windows 10
Pro v1511 (Build 10240) 64-bit.
4.1 Set A: Baseline
Amcache.hve Research
To know the baseline behavior of Am-
cache.hve file, four Windows systems were
installed on different laptops. The results
are as follows:
1. The clean install of Windows 7 does not
result in creation of Amcache.hve.
2. It was observed that clean installation
of Windows 8.1 and Windows 10 result
in creation of Amcache.hve file but not
always in Windows 8.
3. The number of default applications
present in Amcache.hve file depends
upon the operating system under con-
sideration and may vary because of the
configuration settings selected at the
time of installation. Table 5 shows the
default applications installed during a
clean installation of different Windows
operating systems.
4. First reboot of the system re-
sults in creation of ‘Application
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Table 3. Details of experiments devised
Set Objective Actions
A: Baseline
Amcache.hve research
Establish file provenance
To ascertain:
1. When the Amcache.hve is created.
2. Its content just after creation.
3. Interrelated files and their content.
4. Amcache.hve content following the system reboot or
shutdown.
B: Advanced
Amcache.hve
research
To observe the content of
Amcache.hve file and
interrelated files after repeated
user activities
B1
To observe the effects of
basic user activities
To ascertain:
1. Amcache.hve content after running a host-based executable.
2. Content of interrelated files after running a host-based
executable
B2
To observe the effects of
installing an application from host
To ascertain:
1. Content of Amcache.hve file after installing an application.
2. Content of interrelated files after installing an application.
B3
To observe the effects of
connecting external devices
To ascertain:
1. Content of Amcache.hve file after an executable file is
run from a USB drive.
2. Content of Amcache.hve after an executable file is
installed from a USB drive.
B4
To observe the effects of
Metro Apps
To ascertain:
1. Content of Amcache.hve after installing a
Metro App.
2. Content of interrelated files after installing
a Metro App.
C: Anti-forensic
attempts
To observe the effects of
anti-forensic attempts
To ascertain:
1. What happens if the Amcache.hve file is deleted.
2. What happens when interrelated files are deleted.
3. Modifying the timestamps of Amcache.hve.
Table 4. Software tools used in study
Software tool Purpose
Registry Explorer To parse Amcache.hve file
DCodea Binary data to date/time converter
HxD Hex Editorb To view/modify raw content of Amcache.hve file
a Available from: http://www.digital-detective.net/digital
-forensic-software/free-tools/
b Available from: https://mh-nexus.de/en/hxd/
Experience Inventory’ file at the
same location of Amcache.hve file.
The inventory file is named as
AEINV AMI WER {MachineID} DATE
TIME.xml, where DATE and TIME
are file creation date and time (in
GMT) while MachineID is 16 bytes
GUID value generated by Windows
system.
5. It was observed that no other associated
file(s) was created until no user activity
was performed except system shutdown
or reboot.
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Table 5. Applications in Amcache.hve on initial creation
Windows 8 Pro (Build 9200) Windows 8.1 Pro (Build 9600) Windows 10 Pro (Build 10240)
Size of
Amcache.hve
(in KB)
256 256 64
Default
applications
C:\Windows\System32\csrss.exe
C:\Windows\System32\dwm.exe
C:\Windows\System32\LogonUI.exe
C:\Windows\System32\services.exe
C:\Windows\System32\smss.exe
C:\Windows\System32\SppExtComObj.Exe
C:\Windows\System32\taskhost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\taskhostex.exe
C:\Windows\System32\wininit.exe
C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe
C:\Windows\System32\oobe \msoobe.exe
C:\Windows\System32\wbem \WmiPrvSE.exe
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\ByteCodeGenerator.exe
C:\Windows\System32\csrss.exe
C:\Windows\System32\dwm.exe
C:\Windows\explorer.exe
C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe
C:\Program Files\Windows Defender\MsMpEng.exe
C:\Program Files\Windows Defender\NisSrv.exe
C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe
C:\Windows\System32\SearchIndexer.exe
C:\Windows\System32\services.exe
C:\Windows\System32\SettingSyncHost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\smss.exe
C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\taskhost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\taskhostex.exe
C\Windows\System32\ThumbnailExtractionHost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\wininit.exe
C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe
C:\Windows\System32\wbem \WMIADAP.exe
C:\Windows\System32\wbem \WmiPrvSE.exe
C:\Windows\System32\oobe \setup.exe
C:\Windows\System32\csrss.exe
C:\Windows\System32\dllhsot.exe
C:\Windows\System32\drvinst.exe
C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe
C:\Windows\System32\applicationframehost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\dwm.exe
C:\Windows\explorer.exe
C:\Windows\System32\oobe \firstlogonanim.exe
C:\Windows\System32\logonui.exe
C:\Windows\System32\oobe \msoobe.exe
C:\Windows\System32\utilman.exe
C:\Windows\System32\sysprep \sysprep.exe
C:\Windows\System32\oobe \windeploy.exe
C:\Windows\System32\oobe \oobeldr.exe
C:\Windows\System32\wininit.exe
C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe
C:\Windows\System32\vssvc.exe
C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
C:\Windows\System32\sppsvc.exe
C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe
C:\Windows\System32\services.exe
C:\Windows\System32\smss.exe
C:\Windows\System32\lsass.exe
C:\Windows\System32\csrss.exe
C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe
C:\Windows\servicing\trustedinstaller.exe
C:\program files\windows defender\msmpeng.exe
4.2 Set B: Advanced
Amcache.hve Research
Reconstructing the artifacts left by user ac-
tivities on a computer system is part of
many forensic examinations where user ac-
tivity is of investigators’ interest. The fol-
lowing subsections describe the behavior of
Amcache.hve and its interrelated files when
different user activities are performed on a
Windows system. For this, Windows 10
Pro system was taken into consideration
and the numerous user activities were car-
ried out including running host-based exe-
cutable programs, installing of software ap-
plications, running an executable file from a
USB thumb drive, visiting URLs from web
browsers, installing Metro Apps from Win-
dows Store etc. The effects of such user ac-
tivities on Amcache.hve were observed and
the findings are summarized in the next sub-
sections.
4.2.1 B1: Running a host-based
executable
It was observed that when a host-based ex-
ecutable is run for the first time after in-
stallation of operating system, the times-
tamp of run along with executable file path
are recorded in Amcache.hve. No artifacts
related to run count is recorded in Am-
cache.hve file and its interrelated files. How-
ever, the timestamp of last modification is
recorded in Amcache.hve file, which is al-
ways the timestamp of first time the exe-
cutable was run. It means that successive
runs of the host-based executable does not
effect the Amcache.hve file. Figure 2 shows
the timestamp of first run and executable file
path of notepad application.
4.2.2 B2: Installing a software
program from host
For conducting this experiment, Mozilla
Firefox was installed from the host and sub-
sequently run for the first time. The Am-
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Figure 2. Timestamp of first run and executable file path of notepad application recorded in
Amcache.hve
cache.hve file is extracted and then ana-
lyzed using HxD hex editor and the arti-
facts related to Mozilla Firefox were iden-
tified. We observed that when a software
program is installed then there are two lo-
cations in Amcache.hve file at which related
artifacts are found. At first location, the full
file path from which the executable was run
is recorded in file reference key under File
key. Figure 3 shows the full file path of exe-
cutable of Mozilla Firefox from where it was
run along with the timestamp of run. At sec-
ond location in program ID of Mozilla Fire-
fox under the Programs key recorded numer-
ous artifacts such as program name, program
version, publisher name, program type etc.
4.2.3 B3: Installing and running a
software program from
external storage media
This experiment was performed to know the
type of artifacts retained in Amcache.hve
file when the applications are installed from
external devices. A package application
(Proxifier Version 3.21 for our case) contain-
ing five executables tied into a package was
installed from a USB drive to test whether
information related to all executables is
recorded. Subsequently, the system was al-
lowed to shutdown so that the modifications
in the Amcache.hve file could be stored
on disk. The Amcache.hve file was then
extracted and analyzed using a hex editor.
We found program ID, program name and
version, install source, file referenced keys,
uninstall registry key and full path to file as
shown in Figure 4. The related information
such as install timestamp, publisher name,
package GUID and volume GUID were also
observed in Amcache.hve file which are not
shown in the figure for visual convenience.
We found five file referenced keys namely:
200014f20, 200014f13, 200014f1d, 200014f22
and 600014f16. Each file referenced key cor-
responds to a referenced file by the package
application. For our case, 200014f20 re-
ferred to Proxifier.exe, 200014f13 referred
to ProxyChecker.exe, 200014f1d referred
to SysSettings32.exe, 200014f22 referred
to SysSettings64.exe and 600014f16 re-
ferred to unins000.exe. In addition to this,
we also found the created timestamp of each
referenced file with their file path in the
Amcache.hve file.
The information related to referenced files
by a package application can be very useful
to forensic/malware analysts. The analysis
of Amcache.hve file can provide the name of
all referenced files by a malicious program.
When a portable program is run from USB
drive, the artifacts of such portable programs
are recorded in Amcache.hve file. Figure
5 shows various artifacts related to DCode
program which was run from a USB drive,
including timestamp of run, program name
etc. It was observed that no information re-
lated to USB Volume label is recorded in
Amcache.hve file; however, Amcache.hve file
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Figure 3. Timestamp of run and installed file path of Mozilla Firefox in Amcache.hve
Figure 4. Recorded information related to application installed from USB drive
stores the drive letter assigned to a USB
drive. Apart from it, Amcache.hve also
stores Volume GUID of USB and the full
path of executable file placed on USB drive.
Further, no information related to previous
runs of DCode was found in Amcache.hve
file. Also, we could not find any information
related to applications when the applications
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are run from network drives.
4.2.4 B4: Installing a Metro App
from Windows Store
This experiment was performed to investi-
gate the effects of installing a Metro App
from Windows Store on Amcache.hve. For
this, a laptop running Windows 10 Pro was
considered and Facebook App was installed
from Windows Store. Subsequently, Am-
cache.hve file was extracted and parsed to
observe the artifacts related to Facebook
App. It was found that no artifacts re-
lated to Metro Apps is recorded in the
Amcache.hve file; however, information re-
lated to App under consideration were found
in ApplicationInventory.xml file. Figure 6
shows information related to Facebook App
contained in ApplicationInventory.xml file
such as program name, publisher name, in-
stallation timestamp etc. As discussed in
Section 3, these inventory files are not per-
manently stored on disk volume. Also, the
traces of evidence of Metro Apps were not
always found in this inventory file.
4.3 Set C: Performing
Anti-Forensic Attempts
on Amcache.hve
This experiment was conducted to simulate
anti-forensic attempts carried out on Am-
cache.hve file to mislead a forensic investi-
gator. For this, Amcache.hve and associated
inventory files were deleted from a system
running Windows 10 Pro. It was observed
that users cannot delete Amcache.hve file
while Windows is running as this file is open
in system; however, deletion can be achieved
by mounting Windows system drive from a
Live Boot DVD of Ubuntu 14.04 LTS. The
findings of this experiment for system under
consideration are as follows:
 When the Amcache.hve file was deleted,
it was recreated on system reboot with
new created and modified timestamps.
Furthermore, it was also observed that
if any host-based executable was run
or any software program was installed,
then new Amcache.hve file was created
in the same session with new created
and modified timestamps. The finding
of this experiment supports the theory
that Amcache.hve is always open in sys-
tem whilst the computer system is run-
ning; however, the changes in the Am-
cache.hve are written to disk when a
system reboot, shutdown, sleep, or hi-
bernation state is initiated.
 The new Amcache.hve file was found
smaller in size (32 KB) than the orig-
inal Amcache.hve file (64 KB following
a clean install).
 The further activities caused the new in-
formation to be stored in the newly cre-
ated Amcache.hve file updating its mod-
ified timestamp. For example, activ-
ity performed here on system under re-
view was installing Mozilla Firefox web
browser from USB thumb drive. Ta-
ble 6 summarizes the behavior (created
and modified timestamps) of new Am-
cache.hve file with respect to considered
activity.
To check the consistency of the findings
listed above, the same experiment was repli-
cated on a Windows 8 Pro 64-bit system and
it was observed that the results were differ-
ent, as discussed:
 When the Amcache.hve file was deleted,
it was not recreated on system reboot.
However, any user activity followed by
system reboot resulted in creation of
new Amcache.hve file.
 Running a host-based executable or in-
stalling an executable produced a new
Amcache.hve file with new created and
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Figure 5. Recorded information related to portable executable in Amcache.hve
Figure 6. Stored information related to Facebook App in ApplicationInventory.xml file
Table 6. Created and modified timestamps changes to Amcache.hve in Windows 10
Experiment Activities
Size
(KB)
Created
timestamp
Modified
timestamp
A, 1.1
Clean install
Amcache.hve
64 21/04/16 12:07 21/04/16 12:07
A, 1.1
Delete Amcache.hve
@12:20, reboot
32 21/04/16 12:20 21/04/16 12:20
B3, 1.2
Install Mozilla Firefox
visit URLs, reboot
64 21/04/16 12:20 21/04/16 12:31
modified timestamps. Size of the new
Amcache.hve was observed to be same
as of the original. Further, the effect
of user activities on Amcache.hve file in
Windows 8 Professional was found to be
same as in Windows 10 Pro.
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4.4 Forensic Utilization of
Amcache.hve Information
The Amcache.hve information can be very
useful to track the applications run on a sus-
pected system. The following subsections
demonstrate the forensic application of Am-
cache.hve information.
4.4.1 Tracking deleted applications
Previously run applications leave traces in
Windows registry, Shortcut files, Jump Lists
and in Prefetch folder. However, if the traces
from these locations are deleted manually,
the information related to run applications
can no longer be ascertained; however, the
Amcache.hve stores the traces of deleted ap-
plications and analyzing it can reveal arti-
facts of the deleted applications. The analy-
sis can also reveal the timestamp of deletion.
Therefore, if the evidence file is deleted, in-
formation related to evidence file can be ex-
tracted by analyzing the Amcache.hve file.
If a suspected user wipes out all traces
of run applications using a privacy protec-
tion tool and also cleans the traces of such
tools, the investigator cannot find the traces
of such anti-forensic behaviors by analyzing
the Windows registry, Shortcut files, Jump
Lists or Prefetch folder; however, the traces
of such privacy protection tools can be ob-
tained by analyzing the Amcache.hve file.
We considered a hypothetical case in
which a suspected user wipes out all traces
of previously run applications (say, evidence
file) by use of a privacy protection tool
(CCleaner) followed by the deletion of this
tool from the system. The investigator’s job
is to find out the information related to evi-
dence file and the traces of anti-forensic tool
considered in case.
The analysis of Amcache.hve file of the
suspected system can reveal the required in-
formation to investigator. The investiga-
tor can list out all the deleted applications
including their execution file path, times-
tamp created, timestamp of first run, ref-
erenced files by applications, timestamp of
deletion etc. The Figure 7 shows the traces
of CCleaner application in Amcache.hve file
when the application has been deleted from
the system. The timestamps of applications’
installation and deletion can be obtained by
decoding Unix 32-bit hex value to date and
time format using DCode.
4.4.2 Tracking malwares
The Amcache.hve file records hash (SHA-1)
of executable file that can provide immensely
useful information to track the applications.
Malware analysts can leverage this informa-
tion to track malwares and their referenced
files on a victim system. The traces of run
malware persist even if it get deleted or
wiped itself from the system.
To test if we can trace a malware, a com-
puter system was infected with a malware
sample ‘xiaose.exe.’ The computer system
was restarted and allowed to run malware
program followed by shutdown to extract
Amcache.hve from Windows system using
Live Boot DVD of Ubuntu 14.04 LTS. The
extracted Amcache.hve was then parsed us-
ing Registry Explorer and traces of malware
sample was observed as shown in Figure 8.
We found SHA-1 hash of xiaose.exe in value
101 as highlighted in the figure. The hash of
the malware was found to be same when it
was analyzed on Virus Total where it was de-
tected 54 times as a malicious program out of
56 anti-virus. Thus, the hash of executable
files can be very useful information to detect
the malicious programs run on a system.
4.4.3 Tracking applications run from
external devices
To identify the portable applications run
from external devices is a part of many
forensic investigations. The analysis of
Amcache.hve file can prove to be a use-
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Figure 7. Install and delete timestamps of CCleaner application recorded in Amcache.hve
Figure 8. SHA-1 hash of malware program recorded in Amcache.hve
ful forensic utility in the cases where arti-
facts of external devices mounted on a sys-
tem have been removed from the UserAssist
and MountedDevices registry key. The Am-
cache.hve file records the full path to exe-
cutable file from which the application was
executed. The drive letter recorded in this
file path can distinguish the fixed and re-
movable devices. In addition to this, the Vol-
ume GUID of external device is also recorded
in Amcache.hve file. The experimental re-
sults discussed in 4.2.3 and shown in Figure
5 that shows the drive letter and the Volume
GUID assigned to a USB device from which
the portable executable (DCode) was run.
However, no information related to drive la-
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bel and run count of portable executable was
observed in Amcache.hve file.
5. DISCUSSIONS
This section describes the information that
can and cannot be gathered from Am-
cache.hve file and similar sources. We com-
pare forensic potential of similar sources,
namely, IconCache.db, SRUDB.dat (present
in Windows 8 and higher versions) and
Prefetch folder with Amcache.hve file as
shown in Table 7. The IconCache.db file
records the file paths of applications that
have been executed, viewed, stored, installed
or copied (Lee & Lee, 2014); however, Icon-
Cache.db file does not record any informa-
tion related to timestamps of the applica-
tions. The SRUDB.dat file stores process
details including run timestamp, file path
and run count of applications; however, the
precise startup times are not available from
SRUDB.dat file, but it is possible to deter-
mine that the application was run on a par-
ticular date (Khatri, 2015). Also, the traces
from some of deleted applications were not
always recorded in SRUM data. Prefetch
files can provide information such as ap-
plication name, file path from which the
application was run, created and modified
timestamps and run count of applications.
However, if an application has been deleted
from the system, the delete timestamp is not
recorded in the Prefetch file. Also, popular
privacy protection tools such as CCleaner,
BCWipe, CleanAfterMe or Privacy Eraser
are able to delete artifacts in Prefetch files.
Fortunately, the Amcache.hve stored arti-
facts such as the timestamp of an appli-
cation’s first run and traces of deleted ap-
plications including the timestamp of dele-
tion, which are not recorded in any other
sources considered; however, the information
related to run count of applications is not ob-
served in Amcache.hve file. Thus, for better
tracking of applications we can correlate and
combine the information in IconCache.db,
SRUDB.dat and Prefetch files with the in-
formation in Amcache.hve file.
6. CONCLUSION
User activity analysis on a suspected sys-
tem is part of many forensic investigations.
The Amcache.hve file as a new artifact was
first introduced in Windows 8 that records
the information related to Windows Applica-
tion Experience and Compatibility feature.
Forensic investigators can leverage the infor-
mation retained in Amcache.hve file to trace
the user activities performed on a system
specially related to program executions.
This paper investigates the evidential po-
tential of Windows Amcache.hve file and its
application in digital forensics. For identi-
fying the artifacts retained in Amcache.hve
and investigating the effects of user activi-
ties on Amcache.hve, the experiments were
devised in three sets. The results of exper-
iments conducted in this research highlight
the important advantages of examining the
Amcache.hve file which are as follows:
 It is useful to find recent run applica-
tions and their respective history.
 It represents the information related to
Windows Application Experience
and Compatibility feature.
 The information remains in the Am-
cache.hve file even when the application
and Prefetch folder have been deleted.
 Anti-forensic tools such as CCleaner
are not able to remove Amcache.hve file
as it is being used during the Windows
runtime;
 Amcache.hve file is an excellent source
for malware analysts to trace pro-
gram executions.
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Table 7. Comparison of information recorded in IconCache.db, SRUDB.dat, Prefetch folder and
Amcache.hve
Application name
and file path
Created
timestamp
Last modified
timestamps
Run
count
Uninstall
timestamp
Referenced
files
Information related
to Metro Apps
Unknown by popular
privacy protection tools
IconCache.db X × × × × × × ×
SRUDB.dat X X × X × × X X
Prefetch X X X X × X × ×
Amcache.hve X X X × X X × X
It was observed that the Amcache.hve
file does not record the run count of ap-
plications, so forensic investigators are sug-
gested to combine and correlate the arti-
facts from other sources such as Windows
Shortcut files, UserAssist key and Prefetch
folder, for constructing comprehensive activ-
ity timelines.
7. FURTHER
RESEARCH SCOPE
The further study on Amcache.hve may be
focused on identification of unknown fields
in File and Programs keys in Amcache.hve
file. The research can also be focused on the
analysis of Amcache.hve file when the appli-
cations are run, installed or executed from
the network drive, Internet or from Windows
Store.
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